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THE NEED FOR CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
Joseph Owens

With its probative force drawn solely from premises accessible to the human
mind's own inherent powers, Christian philosophy probes the divinely revealed truths under their naturally knowable aspects. From the apologetic or
defensive angle, this type of philosophy is needed to meet rational queriesone's own or those of others-arising from religious doctrines, for instance
from the tenets of creation, divine providence, immortality of the spiritual
soul, or human destiny. On the positive side, Christian philosophy deepens
the attraction of revealed doctrines in a way comparable to the enhancement
given them by architecture, music, art and poetry in actual Christian life.

I
The expression "Christian philosophy" may seem at first hearing to be a
straightforward phrase, quite as "Canadian philosophy" or "American philosophy." It has, however, been given widely differing interpretations in the
course of its history down the centuries of the Christian era.! In modern times
it has evoked conflicting and even contradictory responses from writers who
have had occasion to examine closely its import and its field of reference. A
brief preliminary overview of modern reactions to the notion is accordingly
in order for any contemporary approach to the question of its need. Naturally
there would not be much point in asking about the need for Christian philosophy today if one is not first satisfied that this type of philosophy has at
least the status of something possible.
On the one hand, for a number of capable modern philosophers and historians the expression "Christian philosophy" has been a blatant contradiction
in terms. It has seemed like a square circle. In the present century it was
compared by the German philosopher Heidegger to the notion of "iron
wood."2 Something that has the nature of iron obviously cannot be wood, and
something that has the nature of wood cannot be iron any more than a square
can be circular. For those writers, a teaching that is characteristically Christian is something that is accepted on the authority of Christian revelation. It
is not something that can be reasoned to on the philosophical plane. In
contrast, a philosophical tenet is something developed by human reason
alone, apart from any revelation through religious channels. "Christian," for
them, will involve belief in something on the basis of divine authority, while
philosophy eschews any such dependence on a religious source. The case has
been regarded by those thinkers as solidly grounded and airtight, and accordFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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ingly as closed. What is philosophical is understood, in the light of unaided
human reason, while something specifically Christian is not understood but
is believed on the strength of its religious source. The religious source is not
something in the purely rational order. Stated bluntly and succinctly, that is
one side of the issue at stake. The stand is definite.
On the other hand, "Christian philosophy" is a notion that has been in use
from quite early times in our era, and today it has received greater prominence
than ever before. 3 It is a conception that persists, in spite of all attacks upon
it. In its earliest use it stood for the way of thinking that in Christian life
assumed the prestige held by philosophy in the ancient Greek world. It was
what provided an account of the universe as a whole, culminating in the
problems of human destiny. So for Augustine all Greek philosophy had
reached its apex in Plotinus and now melded with Christian doctrine in giving
an overall view of human life. 4 This was what Augustine himself termed
"Christian philosophy." It was "our philosophy," as it had been called in
earlier Christian circles. It had quite the same bearing as what one means
today in speaking of a general philosophy of life. It was not restricted to
today's narrower significance of a special branch in academic studies.
With this concept of Christian philosophy, as it is first found in patristic
writings, there can hardly be any quarrel from today's perspectives. But in
medieval times "philosophy" became sharply distinguished from sacred theology. Philosophy for the medievals was based on naturally evident principles
only, while theology proceeded from divinely revealed truths. The distinction
between the two was clear-cut and decisive. The pagan writers were regarded
by the thinkers of the middle ages as the "philosophers." In contrast, the
Christian writers were the "theologians."3 But those theologians in their work
made copious use of the philosophers. Against that background a present-century historian of medieval philosophy, Etienne Gilson, found a number of
"Christian philosophies" within the theological writings of the middle ages.
Gilson published books with titles such as The Christian Philosophy of Saint
Augustine,6 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,' The Christian
Philosophy of the Middle Ages,8 and a general introduction under the caption
Introduction a la philosophie chretienne. 9 Used in this direct contrast to
Christian theology, the expression "Christian philosophy" has now become a
commonly accepted phrase, regardless of disagreement about its meaning or
its possibility.
Long before Gilson's time, in fact, the academic distinction between philosophy and sacred theology had become solidly established in university
circles, especially in Scholastic writings and in the German school tradition.
The basic division of the one type of study from the other seemed sufficiently
obvious. The two were accordingly regarded as radically different disciplines.
Philosophy grounded its reasoning on naturally acceptable starting points. It
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could not make use of revealed truth as premises for its demonstrations. In
consequence it could not permit itself to be specified by anything that was
given through divine revelation. In this traditional setting no philosophy
seemed amenable to designation by the notion "Christian," as many modem
writers viewed the situation. Hence arose the stand that there can no more be
a Christian philosophy than there could be a Christian mathematics or a
Christian chemistry.
In Gilson's day this objection was expressly raised against the very notion
of "Christian philosophy" by another prominent French historian of philosophy and expert in medieval writings, Emile Brehier. A formal debate between
the two conflicting views on the topic was arranged in the early thirties of
the present century. In it the issues were clearly drawn up. to Both sides agreed
from the start that as a philosophy a Christian philosophy had to be accountable solely to the tribunal of unaided human reason. It could not appeal to
religious sources for support. That condition was accepted unhesitatingly by
both sides in the debate. It focused the problem precisely on the question how
Christianity could specify a discipline without entering intrinsically into its
reasoning processes.
To Cartesian or Enlightenment philosophers, this objection necessarily presented a veritable impasse. Where the structure of philosophy was conceived
on the model of a mathematical or experimental science, value free and
mathematically controllable, the motivation or religious conditioning of its
practitioner could not legitimately affect its specification. No matter what the
personal motivation of a mathematician or a physicist may be it does not
serve to characterize his science as specifically Christian, in the Enlightenment
view of the notion "science." That is why there cannot be such a thing as a
Christian mathematics or a Christian chemistry, according to these thinkers.
But we are no longer in the Enlightenment era. In philosophy today, as
understood in the present postmodern and hermeneutic age, the intrinsic
character of one's philosophy varies according to one's linguistic and cultural
upbringing, and in a person's cultural upbringing a decisive role may be
played by the individual religious conditioning and background. In consequence, a philosopher whose motivation and training are Christian can well
be drawn to special problems of personal concern. She or he may readily look
for naturally knowable starting points on the philosophic level that are different from those that would attract a non-Christian. The same holds proportionally, of course, for thinkers brought up in Islamic or Jewish or any other
culture.
In accord with this wide possibility of choice, a selection is in fact made
by each individual thinker from among the indefinitely numerous groupings
of naturally knowable starting points for philosophical reasoning. The selection of this group of philosophical principles may well be dependent on the

170

Faith and Philosophy

person's religious habituation. It can be made freely in line with that motivation. The result is that on such a basis an entire philosophy may be specified
as Christian, even though nothing specifically Christian enters into its reasoning processes. This means that a person can pursue philosophy for the
purpose of aiding her or his religious faith. Because of the direction given
by the extrinsic yet presupposed personal upbringing, the philosophical thinking becomes a specifically distinct type of philosophy from that of non-Christian thinkers. As with Aristotle,l1 a pre-philosophical dialectic serves as the
path leading up to the principles from which the properly philosophic reasoning commences. But the path itself remains extrinsic to the strictly philosophical discourse.
In a word, there is ample ground today for justifying the notion of Christian
philosophy, especially if one is following in some way the current hermeneutical conception of what philosophy is. In this regard one has to show that
Christian interests do in fact furnish the motivation for distinctive Christian
philosophy that will elucidate revealed tenets, but will not infringe in any
way upon the domain of sacred theology by introducing dependence on revealed premises. With this more technical formulation of what Christian
philosophy envisages, one is in a position to approach the question whether
or not there is any need for it in today's intellectual world.

II
Perhaps the best approach to the present question will consist in a glance at
a few particular Christian beliefs taken one by one. Each may be examined
in itself to see if it has any need of philosophical understanding in order to
play its role more effectively in Christian life and in its relations to philosophical concerns. The procedure of first considering these tenets individually seems indicated by the lack of any immediately obvious reason why the
notion of Christianity in general should require philosophical support. Christianity had in fact no express mandate from its founder to engage in philosophical activity. Thousands upon thousands of people have led good
Christian lives without any immediate help from absorption in philosophy
courses. Most Christians, perhaps, have little if any inkling of what academic
philosophy means. The issue, accordingly, is best approached not from the
notion of Christianity in general but rather from the consideration of particular Christian beliefs taken each in itself. The individual tenet may be asked
if philosophical elucidation will help it play the part meant for it in religious
practice and in the problems to which it gives rise when it is confronted with
philosophical issues.
As a first instance, one might look at the initial article of the Nicene Creed.
That basic truth of Christian belief readily presents aspects that repay careful
philosophical consideration without at all infringing upon the mystery in-
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volved in this revelation. The article is formulated as "I believe in God, the
Father almighty, the maker of heaven and earth."12 Correspondingly, the opening words of the first book in the Bible are "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth." Here the notion of "making" is familiar enough to natural
reason. It means bringing a new thing into being through transforming some
material into an object different from what it was, as wood for instance is
made into a table or bread is made from flour. But there are difficulties here.
When the totality of the finite things in heaven and earth is under question,
there is no room for any other finite material out of which they could be
made. This notion of creatio ex nihilo, that is, of making something out of
nothing calls accordingly for philosophical elucidation to show that one is
not conceiving nothingness as a sort of material out of which the world would
be educed. Rather, one should mean that nothing else was already in existence
out of which the things could be made. The notion of creation has to be
explained as the imparting of existence without anything whatever to work
upon.
To the inquiring mind this consideration poses a number of questions that
call for philosophical answers. A Christian can of course through the gift of
faith firmly believe what stands written in the Bible or is stated in the creed.
Yet in actual life one has to face one's own questions and also those of the
people with whom one associates. Our mind is naturally inquisitive. It is
thrown at once upon the defensive at the objection that "making" should
require a material out of which something new is made. Here the proper
procedure for human knowledge, one may urge, should be to accept the
supposition that something always was there. One then could theorize about
the "big bang" starting the process that has resulted in the extremely complicated universe we know today. Or, with the medievals, one could argue about
the concept of creation from all eternity. But the making of something without
any preexisting material, as required by the Christian tenet, seems to defy
human comprehension. Ground is offered for the temptation to say that the
very notion is too farfetched to merit any serious consideration. There are
better things to do than to waste time thinking about it. Here the banner of
ridicule is easy to flaunt. Christian faith does indeed require belief in mysteries that readily provide ground for caricature, and the step from the sublime
to the ridiculous can be made to look very short.
Accordingly Christian writers from very early times became engaged in
defensive procedures against such objections to their beliefs. Highly developed Greek philosophy was vigorous and active in the patristic era. In face
of it Christian defenders, or "apologists" as they were called in the Greek
parlance of the day, soon developed the technique of drawing upon philosophy itself to meet philosophical objections. This technique has been described
as their using Goliath's own sword to cut off Goliath's head.13
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The technique, in point of fact, proved effective up to the point for which
it was required. It would not convince anyone already persuaded of the
opposite. But at least it gave oneself, and proclaimed before the public, the
quietude and assurance that one was not flying in the face of human reason
when adhering to Christian beliefs. It used philosophical weapons to decapitate philosophical objections of one's own or those of others, even though by
itself it could not bring about religious conversion.
This apologetic or defensive need for philosophy can be seen persisting
down the centuries, through medieval into modern times. One may be startled
at first by new attacks upon Christian faith. But if one has sufficient philosophical knowledge to see the foundations upon which the structure of the
objections is raised, one is not disturbed. One is able to see how one's own
philosophical thinking is not at all affected by the opposed conclusions. They
are conclusions that may proceed cogently on the basis of other philosophies,
but not at all from one's own starting points. Accordingly one's own religious
beliefs remain untroubled by the objections or the caricature. The other person's stand likewise stays unaffected. There is no conversion, as long as each
adheres to the starting points already adopted. But one has shown convincingly that one's own religious belief can stand up just as strongly as ever in
the pluralistic ambient of philosophy today. That is all that is required when
the situation is viewed from the defensive or apologetic angle. Here Christian
philosophy has been notably rewarding and satisfying. Surely it fills a need.
Hence in regard to the present example, namely the belief that God made
the heavens and the earth, the belief mentioned first in Bible and creed, one
can smooth out the notion of "making" in a way that allows room for the
Christian belief in creation out of nothing. "Making," or in traditional philosophical terminology "efficient causality," can be explained as the giving of
existence to something else, rather than in the older Greek conception of
starting motion in something already existent. The things we experience
around us receive and lose existence. The existence cannot be explained just
by the thing's nature. The nature of a tree just as a tree, for instance, does
not mean that the tree actually exists. Its present existence, rather, does not
come from itself but from something else. The process is traced back to
existence that subsists of itself, and the existence so reached is God as philosophically conceived. In this perspective "making" is elucidated as the imparting of existence, whether or not some material is already there. The notion
of "making" is accordingly freed from necessary dependence upon a material
out of which the thing is made. The Christian belief that God created all
existents other than himself is thereby secured from the philosophical attack
that a preexistent material is required. "Making" is shown to mean the imparting of existence, whether or not a preexisting material is there to receive
the actuation.
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One may, of course, insist that this manner of reaching God from the
existence of sensible things through rational discourse is the procedure of a
particular type of philosophy, a type of existential thinking that is far from
enjoying general acceptance in the philosophical world of today or of any
other epoch. That observation is true. But need it be surprising in the current
hermeneutical conception of the nature of philosophy? The starting points of
philosophies vary indefinitely, and the whole of each properly reasoned philosophy follows consistently in the wake of the respective starting points.
Hence the well-known observation that philosophers never agree among
themselves. 14 Accordingly we have our present-day genial pluralism in the
philosophical world.
What is at issue here is to understand the rationale of this pluralism. The
starting points need to be carefully selected. Then the rest of your philosophy
follows cogently in their wake, if you are thinking consistently. IS Even the
philosophies of other thinkers will become interpreted in the light of one's
own principles. Aquinas, for instance, could take Aristotle's reasoning to
divine existence, from actuality and potentiality, and make it prove something
that Aristotle never intended. With existence recognized as the dominant and
immediately known actuality in sensible things, the structure of the Aristotelian reasoning is seen to culminate for Aquinas in a unique and infinite God,
instead of in the finite separate substances of the Stagirite. Likewise Aquinas
takes the arguments of other thinkers besides Aristotle and interprets them in
the light of his own starting points, reaching cogently his own characteristic
conclusions. The point here is that one's personal philosophic starting points
determine the way one interprets a philosophical demonstration.
What is required for the apologetic or defensive purposes, then, is to understand the way philosophies work. The hermeneutic understanding of the
nature of philosophy decapitates the objection that one is merely using one's
own personal starting points, instead of submitting to an alleged agreement
among philosophers after the fashion expected for an Enlightenment science.
It meets the objection in a thoroughly philosophical way, namely by a philosophical manifestation of the nature of philosophy itself. It is using Goliath's
sword in precisely that manner. Where the existential actuality of sensible
things is seen as the basic determination in the starting points, its influence
will be all-pervasive and decisive. Only by the use of radically different
starting points will the allegedly insuperable difficulties arise.
A materialistic philosophy, for instance, starts from the tenet that whatever
can be known has length, breadth and thickness. From that starting point there
is no way of reaching anything immaterial, such as the spiritual soul or an
existence that subsists just in itself. That type of starting point can hardly
hope to ground a demonstration that God exists, as God is believed in by a
Christian. The Christian philosopher understands this, and thereby sees that
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the arguments of his opponent do not affect his own philosophical reasoning
to the existence of God. Likewise, the Kantian objection that the categories
of theoretical reasoning are meant to apply only to the sensible world and
have no validity outside what is sensible, does not at all touch a philosophy
that reasons from starting points of a different type. But in all cases like this,
the Christian thinker needs to understand the nature of philosophy itself, and
keep aware of how it works. Philosophy itself is what gives reassurance here.
Accordingly there is definite need for a philosophy that is Christian. That
philosophy does not convert anybody, nor is it intended to do so. But it is
immensely reassuring. It enables one to remain steadfast in upholding the
inherent dignity of human intelligence while accepting mysteries on religious
faith. It is Goliath's own sword, namely philosophy, that is used by the
Christian thinker to sever the head of the attacker by making manifest the
nature of the starting points or principles upon which the assault was based.
These considerations, then, illustrate vividly the defensive or apologetic
side of Christian philosophy in the demonstration of the existence of God as
maker of the universe. Christian philosophy, precisely as such, is not meant
to convert anybody to belief in the Christian God. That is a prerogative of
divine grace. It is in no way a task for philosophy. But the situation does
establish an important role for philosophy in Christian life. All in all, a
Christian philosophy is from this angle a veritable need. It is a solid defense
of Christian belief on the intellectual level.
This defensive or apologetic side of Christian philosophy may at first
hearing have a decidedly negative ring. But even in the demonstration of
God's existence it resounds with positive appeal, and amply so. In understanding existence as the very nature of God, philosophy offers a penetrating
overture into a fuller grasp of the status of all perfections in God. Without
existence there cannot be the least actuality or perfection. There would be
just nothing. In the other extreme, where existence subsists, as it does in God,
it involves all perfections. Hence anything at all positive that we can imagine
or think of, has to be found in its primary existence in God. Once existence
has been shown with Aquinas to be "the actuality of all actualities" and "the
perfection of all perfections,"l6 God is seen to be endowed by his very nature
with all positive attributes in an infinitely high degree. That includes the
attribute of power, power that in subsistent existence is not hemmed in by
any finite nature, a nature that would inevitably limit its extent. Thereby God
is shown to be omnipotent in the way required by the notion of creation ex
nihilo, insofar as the divine ability to "make" is not limited by any demand
for a material upon which to act. Similarly God's concurrence in the act of
human free will in creatures does not infringe upon human or angelic liberty.
This gives philosophical basis for the rhetorical question in the Scriptures
" ... what achievement of ours but the doing of it is thine?"l7
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These very positive aspects can be elucidated in the pursuit of Christian
philosophy. The process gives tremendous satisfaction to the inquiring human
intellect. It is at every step a means of solidity and sustenance in one's
religious practice. It provides a rational framework for the deepening and
development of one's spirituality. Surely just as the arts of poetry, music,
painting and architecture can give very positive elevation to religious life
without detriment to their nature as arts, so this positive function of Christian
philosophy may be regarded as a need for Christian life in overall fashion.
Though developed professionally in academic minds, it is able to simmer
down to the general Christian public through popular preaching and literature
and art.
In itself, however, none of the philosophical reasoning about the first article
of the Christian creed reaches to the notion of God as a father. One of the
criticisms leveled against the Greek philosopher Aristotle is that his conception of God as the prime mover of the universe is too cold a notion to be
applied to the God of Christian revelation. It has been regarded as incongruous in a Christian context. But this objection bears on something beyond the
philosophical demonstration's scope. Philosophical reasoning is not at all
capable of reaching the notion of God as father, either within the divine
Trinity or in the adoption of human beings through grace as God's children.
Those are truths left for supernatural revelation. The fatherhood of God in
both respects remains a mystery of faith. Yet as creator of the visible universe
God can be known by philosophical reasoning, and the infinite existence that
is so known remains open to whatever further aspects faith may add to it.
There is, moreover, nothing necessarily cold about the philosophical notion
of subsistent existence. Subsistent existence opens out to the inclusion of
every perfection or intelligible attraction that may be brought into our awareness through means beyond philosophical discovery. Philosophy shows that
subsistent existence, because infinite, far surpasses the power of the human
mind to comprehend. Philosophy thereby solidly establishes the conclusion
that there can be more things in heaven and earth than can be dreamt of. In
regard to the divine nature, philosophy cannot bring forward any cogent
reason why an infinitely perfect nature could not be internally related to itself
in three different ways in the persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Philosophy has no means for making these internal relations manifest. But by
the same token it cannot bring out any demonstrative reason against the
revealed tenet. It accordingly offers no valid ground for disbelief. The finitude of the human mind cannot, even by definition, hope to penetrate the
fullness of an infinite first cause. That is why human reason cannot understand or explain or do away with the mystery of the blessed Trinity.
In a word, a philosophic consideration of the first article of the creed aptly
illustrates the helpful role of Christian philosophy. It offers intellectual un-
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derpinning to an article of Christian faith defensively or apologetically. From
that angle it offers deep intellectual attraction to the inquiring mind. By
distinguishing the naturally knowable aspects from those that are attainable
only through revelation it makes clear the extent to which human reason can
uphold or attack the revealed doctrine. In this way philosophy provides
deeply appreciated satisfaction for a groping human intellect, and meets in
welcome fashion a veritable human need. In so doing, moreover, it presents
Christian truth with a depth and appeal fully comparable to the enhancement
given to the riches of religious faith by poetry, music, architecture and art.

III
A second instance that illustrates the need for Christian philosophy may be
found in the problems about the immortality of the human soul. Quite generally people feel that somehow their loved ones live on in one way or another
after bodily death. Grave or crematory is hard to accept as absolutely the end.
Christian belief, moreover, has consistently upheld the soul's immortality.
But rational proof of survival after bodily death turns out to be difficult, and
therefore, perhaps, unwelcome as a topic for ordinary discourse. In a short
manuscript setting forth personal beliefs, Lord Byng of Vimy is said to have
communicated to Georges Vanier, who was later to be one of his successors
as Governor General of Canada, his own attitude towards immortality. Byng
claimed to believe in immortality as implicitly as anyone does. But he was
glad that nobody had ever been able to prove it to him, in spite of numerous
efforts. IS Quite obviously, Christian philosophy may see here a challenge to
probe the reasons for this attitude.
Pagan philosophy was able to show that the range of the human mind's
thinking surpasses the limits of the merely material order. 19 Our thinking
obviously transcends the here and now. We can think in terms of infinite
extension and infinite time. That is enough to show that in its nature the
human soul has capacities that reach beyond material limitations, and that it
accordingly specifies an existence that does not depend upon a body even
though matter is a specifying principle of its nature. This grounds the conclusion that the human soul is naturally indestructible, since its existence does
not depend upon bodily parts that can be dissolved in death. So once the
human soul is endowed with existence it naturally has that existence forever.
Within its own nature there is no material factor that would permit its destruction.
But the topic has its difficulties. In dramatically recounting Socrates' last
discourse in the prison cell before the drinking of the lethal hemlock, Plato
described how the audience was overwhelmed by the sublimity of the topic,
yet did not find the argument convincing. 20 The difficulty was attributed to
the greatness of the subject and the weakness of human intelligence. Our own

THE NEED FOR CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

177

reaction today may not be much different. Philosophical arguments for the
soul's survival may appear enticing, but they do not seem to click with
cogency. For Plato, the soul unlike material things was the cause of its own
motion. It was defined as a self-movent. It was not dependent upon anything
else for its motion, and accordingly was exempt from destruction. This reasoning started in and stayed in the order of life as operation. In that setting,
what the premises entailed was immortality.21 But in his own half dozen or
so discussions on the indestructibility of the spiritual soul, written during the
later periods of his career, Aquinas nowhere makes his reasoning bear on the
soul's immortality. He seems to limit it strictly, against an Aristotelian background, to the notion of indestructibility understood in the Peripatetic sense.
Human beings can think and can will beyond the limits imposed by material
conditions. This shows that human nature has a factor that is not dependent
on matter for its existence. Therefore it cannot lose existence through destruction of the bodily composite. Yet no capability for acting outside the
body is thereby shown. Rather, the soul as we know it cannot naturally be
aware of anything or do any thinking except in terms of material objects. In
consequence it cannot have any activity apart from the body. It is not a ghost
in a machine, as satirized by Gilbert Ryle in our own century. The soul
constitutes but a single agent along with the material side in the body. Accordingly it is naturally inert without the bodily component. Aristotle himself
had insisted that soul and body form but a single agent. 22
For Aquinas, then, any existence that the soul would retain after bodily
death would thereby be naturally one of inactivity. It could not cause in
Platonic fashion any motion at all, let alone self-motion. It would be dormant
in much more radical fashion than persons in the Old Testament Sheol, or in
the Greek Hadys. There would be nothing about it that could be described in
terms that implied life, such as "survival" or "immortality." "Survival" in its
etymology means "living on," and "immortality" means perpetual life as
contrasted with death. "Existence," on the contrary, has "non-existence" as
its opposite. It need not imply the presence of life. A stone is existent, without
being alive. You do not say, in any literal sense, that a stone survives a fire
or that its duration is immortal. Its perpetual existence would not be regarded
as immortality. However, a human soul's perpetual existence without any life
at all would perhaps run much more against the grain for today's normal
thinker than blanket acceptance of annihilation through death. Yet the philosophical possibility of that type of existence for the human soul after death
throws one back on religious faith in regard to its immortality. One may
firmly believe in its future life through Christian faith while refusing to claim
that it can be demonstrated by natural reasoning. At the same time, the
philosophical demonstration of the divine omnipotence allows for means of
activity in the separated soul that are entirely beyond our philosophical ken.
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Against this background one can understand Lord Byng's spontaneous attitude of adhering to immortality for the human soul and at the same time of
being suspicious about philosophical arguments that attempt to demonstrate
it. At least there is need for care in focusing the question upon the precise
aspect that can be reached by philosophical reasoning. The rest may then be
left to religious belief, quite as God may be shown philosophically to be the
creator of the world without any demonstration of fatherhood. Intimations of
immortality there well may be, on account of the mind's thinking in terms
that transcend the material order. But to prove philosophically that the popular intimations so suggested will in fact be realized, is quite another task.
There is good reason for being suspicious about the cogency of philosophical
arguments based upon them.
By the same token, however, a strong philosophical underpinning for religious belief in immortality is provided by the cogent demonstration that
once a spiritual soul has been given existence it can never be separated
naturally from that existence. 23 The spiritual soul is naturally indestructible,
unlike the sensible things that come under our immediate observation. Arguments based on the material nature of perceptible things do not hold in regard
to it. Christian philosophy, therefore, can furnish the believer with solid
defensive or apologetic reasons against the stand that the spiritual soul perishes in death. Further, the positive philosophic study of the spiritual soul's
characteristic activities becomes deeply attractive and satisfying to one's
religious propensities. As Aristotle insisted so eloquently in the opening lines
of his work On the Soul, the study of the soul ranks on the highest level
among the objects that excite and satisfy our natural craving for knowledgeY
It furnishes a second welcome instance of a way in which Christian philosophy can satisfy a religious need.

IV
A third instance that may be brought forward to illustrate the need for Christian philosophy regards human destiny. Christian belief places that destiny in
the beatific vision of God. Human beings, it proclaims, are meant for the
eternal happiness of heaven. Nothing less can really satisfy the longings of
the human heart. In the oft-quoted phrase of Augustine this revealed truth has
been repeated down the centuries: "You have made us for yourself, 0 Lord,
and our heart is restless till it rests in Thee."2s But to cold human reason this
outlook presents anomalies. It means that our highest goodness and happiness
will consist basically in intellectual contemplation. Scripture expresses it as
"This is eternal life: to know thee alone who art truly God .... "26
In his Ethics the Greek philosopher Aristotle had concluded on purely
philosophical grounds that theoretical contemplation is the highest of human
goods and contains all other goods in one way or another within its scope.
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This Aristotelian conception has continually given rise to sharp opposition.
The spontaneous reaction of people is "We don't want to contemplate for all
eternity, we want to do things." A widely read book on Aristotle written by
John Herman Randall shortly after the middle of the present century stated
blandly that if Aristotle were living in modern America he would never have
placed human felicity in contemplation. He would have located it in action
and production and progress. A Christian philosophy based on existence is
not at all bothered by this objection. It can show that things grasped by human
cognition have three different kinds of existence. As we perceive the things
in the sensible world we see that first of all they exist in themselves. As we
reflect upon our own cognition of them, we are aware that they exist also in
our thought. Their existence in themselves, as real, is seen to have an epistemological priority comparable to that of fact over fiction, of truth over
phantasy. Spontaneously we rank the real existence of things as higher than
their existence in somebody's cognition, and the existence of one hundred
dollars in one's pocket as above the hopeful existence ofthem in one's dreams
at a racetrack. A vessel actually battling the waves in a furious storm is
accorded more reality than that of a painted ship upon a painted ocean. It is
doing something in itself, the painted ship is not.
But the things also exist in the creative essence of God. There they have
divine existence, and the beatific knowledge of them through contemplation
of them in the divine essence will be proportionately superior to experience
of them in their own real existence. Experiencing and living them in the
splendor of the divine essence will be a better and fuller and more satisfactory
way of experiencing them. This point is brought home trenchantly when one
applies to it Aristotle's dictum "The actuality of thought is life."27 Far from
being the idleness of a painted ship, it is life and activity in the fullest and
highest degree. It shows on the philosophical level how the beatific vision of
the divine essence, once it has been accepted as a supernaturally revealed
truth, can satisfy the unlimited aspirations of the human heart throughout the
infinite duration of eternity. In positive fashion it thereby makes the prospect
of heaven philosophically attractive.

v
These instances of help from Christian philosophy could be multiplied extensively by going through the numerous tenets of Christian faith one by one.
But the three just considered should be sufficient to illustrate the different
ways in which a Christian philosophy may fill important needs. Defensively
and apologetically Christian philosophy can come to grips with objections
from ourselves and from others in regard to the truths of Christian revelation.
The philosophy does not demonstrate any supernatural truths. It will not
convince anyone who has not already accepted them on religious faith. It
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does not make converts. It merely uses a philosophical sword to cut off the
head of a philosophical objection. That is its apologetic function. The better
your philosophy is, the more effectively will it do the job. Where philosophies
such as materialism or pantheism lead in a different direction from that of
Christian philosophy, an understanding of how those philosophies work will
make manifest the reason why they reach such different conclusions. It will
show on the philosophical level why a Christian philosophy is immune to
their attacks. 28 No philosophy can force any other philosophy to accept the
philosophy's own starting points. In the genial atmosphere of today's pluralism, this is an attitude that has every right to claim universal acceptance.
That is the apologetic side. But positively, Christian philosophy will bring
out the marvelous intellectual appeal of Christian belief and life that is
grounded by the revealed truths. From this angle, Christian philosophy should
surely rank with poetry, music, painting and architecture in enhancing the
impression of the Christian message upon the human mind. There is accordingly a corresponding need for the philosophy, working in its own characteristic fashion. The three instances just considered, namely the existence of
God, the indestructibility of the spiritual soul, and the location of the supreme
human happiness in contemplation, bring out vividly the way Christian philosophy meets this need. 29
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